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Political connections and tax-induced earnings management: 
Evidence from China 
 
Abstract: We use the occasion of a change in tax policy that raised the tax rate for 
many of the listed companies in China to examine tax-induced earnings management 
(TEM) from the perspective of political connections. We find that when the tax rate 
increased, only those affected firms with politically connected management engaged 
in TEM. This suggests that, in addition to motivation for managing earnings, 
capability of influencing tax authorities is also an important determinant of TEM. We 
also find that TEM helped the firms with politically connected management to 
reduce their tax burden. 
 
JEL: G32; G38; H26; M41 
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1. Introduction 
This paper investigates tax-induced earnings management (TEM) from the 
perspective of political connections. It is related to two lines of the literature. The 
first line is TEM. The extant research shows that firms manage their earnings to 
reduce their tax burden when tax rates change. Dhaliwal and Wang (1992) and 
Manzon (1992) find that firms move earnings from the period with higher tax rates 
to the period with lower tax rates while Gramlich, Limpaphayom, and Rhee (2004) 
show that keiretsu firms strategically shift financially reported income among 
affiliates in order to reduce overall effective tax rates. Maydew (1997) examines the 
methods used by firms to move earnings over different periods when the firms 
engage in TEM. Researchers have also examined the relationship between firm 
characteristics and TEM and found that large-sized firms (Scholes, Wilson and 
Wolfson 1992), high-leveraged firms (Guenther 1994), and firms subject to 
aggressive tax policies (Lopez, Regier and Lee 1998) are more likely to engage in 
TEM. 
There are several unsolved issues in the extant research on TEM. Most of the 
studies in this area are based on a major tax reform in the United States in 1986 
which reduced corporate tax rates for all firms. It is not clear whether and how firms 
conduct TEM when tax rates are expected to increase. Another problem is that while 
prior studies focus on motivation, they tend to neglect that capability of achieving 
the goal of earnings management is also important. When the tax rate changes, 
although the affected firms are motivated to manage their earnings, not all of the 
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firms can actually do so because of the inability to reduce taxes and the punishment 
from the government associated with earnings management. Finally, studies mainly 
focus on whether TEM occurs, but it is still unknown whether firms actually lower 
their tax burden through earnings management. 
The second line of the related literature investigates the relationship between 
government intervention and firm value. Studies show that rent seeking, extraction, 
and protection are important objectives of government intervention (Stigler 1971; 
Spiller 1990; Shleifer and Vishny 1998). Shleifer and Vishny (1994, 1998) find that 
intervention by politicians in business activities is greater when institutional 
constraints are weak. This finding is extremely important in China where a centrally 
controlled economy is moving towards a free market economy. On one hand, 
government intervention can decrease firm value (Shleifer and Vishny 1994, 1998). 
Because property rights protection in China is weak and the product and capital 
markets are far from liberalized, politicians are more likely to pursue social 
objectives or private gains at the firm’s expense. Fan, Wong, and Zhang (2007) find 
that firms with politically connected CEOs (a measure of government intervention) 
perform worse after going public than do firms without politically connected CEOs. 
Berkman, Cole, and Fu (2012) find that block-share transfers from state-controlled 
entities to private entities result in improvement in corporate governance and 
increases in firm value. On the other hand, government intervention and political 
connections can also increase firm value. China’s transition from a centrally 
controlled economy to a free market economy means that China’s economy is still 
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relationship-based rather than market-based. Government privileges are provided to 
firms with politically connected management. Using survey data, He and Li (2005) 
show that there is a positive correlation between a firm’s performance and 
management political connections in China. Similarly, Fisman (2001) shows that in 
Indonesia, a large percentage of a well-connected firm’s value is derived from 
political connections. Johnson and Mitton (2003) also find that Malaysian firms 
with stronger political connections suffered more when the 1997 Asian financial 
crisis reduced the government’s ability to provide privileges and subsidies, and 
benefited more when the imposition of capital controls allowed a higher level of 
subsidies.1  
While the above studies have shown that political connections can benefit or 
hurt a firm, they have paid little attention to the underlying mechanism through 
which political connections affect firm value. This paper aims to examine whether 
TEM is such a mechanism. When the tax rate changes, all affected firms are 
motivated to manage earnings, but this does not mean that all firms will actually do 
so. As mentioned above, only if the firm has politically connected management, 
then paying tax based on the managed earnings is possible. In this way, the 
management political connections help the firm to reduce tax payments. Moreover, 
if the government discovers the earnings management and thus the firm may face 
severe punishment, political connections can reduce the probability and/or 
magnitude of punishment. Hence, not only can political connections help a firm to 
                                                        
1 But Lin and Bo (2012) do not find any evidence that government intervention helps in reducing the firm’s 
financial constraints on investment. 
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achieve the goal of reducing its tax burden, but they can also lower the punishment 
associated with TEM. If we can find empirical evidence that when the tax rate 
changes, the affected firms with political connections are more likely to engage in 
earnings management, then this can help us understand an underlying mechanism 
through which political connections affect firm value.  
This paper examines the TEM phenomenon from the perspective of political 
connections using a change in tax policy in China: in 2000, the Chinese central 
government stipulated a rule that increased the tax rate for some listed companies 
starting from 2002 as detailed later. Our results show that when the tax rates changed, 
those affected firms with political connections were more likely to engage in 
earnings management. Because of the inability to reduce taxes and the punishment 
associated with TEM, those affected firms without political connections were less 
likely to engage in earnings management. We also find that those firms with political 
connections that engaged in earnings management achieved the goal of reducing 
their tax burden. 
This paper makes the following contributions. First, we find that in addition to 
motivation, whether firms are capable (proxied by management political connections) 
is another important factor that a firm determines whether to engage in TEM. Second, 
we find that political connections reduced firms’ tax burden through earnings 
management, which can help us understand the underlying mechanism through 
which political connections affect firm value. Third, the tax reform in our sample 
increased the tax rate, which makes this study quite different from most of the extant 
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studies, in which the tax rate is decreased. Hence, this study provides complementary 
evidence on TEM. Finally, as we examine whether TEM actually achieved the goal 
of lowering the firm’s tax burden, our findings help us better understand the 
economic consequences of TEM. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. We describe the background and 
develop the hypotheses in Section 2. The research design is presented in Section 3. 
Empirical results are discussed in Section 4, followed by robustness checks in 
Section 5. Section 6 concludes the paper. 
 
2. Background and hypotheses development 
The corporate income tax rate for Chinese listed firms is generally 33%, 
according to the 1993 Acting Regulations on Corporate Income Tax. However, the 
central government provides more favorable tax incentives in various regions. For 
example, there are favorable tax rates of around 15% in the five special economic 
zones, 32 economic and technology development zones, 13 free trade zones, and 52 
high-tech development zones. The central government uses these preferential tax 
rates to stimulate economic development in specific regions. 
Although the tax rates for listed firms are set by the central government, before 
2002 the taxes were mostly collected and kept by the local governments in the 
locations where the firms were registered. Listed firms often contribute to local 
economic development and bring employment opportunities in addition to large tax 
revenue. Therefore, the policy of first levying and then rebating taxes (FLTRT) was 
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introduced by local governments to attract capital investment, that is, listed firms 
first paid tax according to the nominal tax rate of 33%, and then would receive a 
18% of reimbursement from the local government, making the actual statutory tax 
rate approximately 15%.  
On October 11, 2000, the Ministry of Finance announced a formal ruling that 
prohibited local governments from providing FLTRT to listed firms after December 
31, 2001. To enforce the termination of FLTRT, the central government also passed 
another ruling, requiring that local governments surrender 50% of their corporate 
income tax revenues, which previously were collected by local governments, based 
on the 33% standard tax rate. Then, in 2003, the percentage of corporate tax revenue 
given to the central government increased from 50% to 60%. Therefore, it became 
financially difficult for local authorities to offer companies tax rebates. The new 
ruling specifically subjected listed companies to the 33% corporate income tax rate. 
The direct effect of the termination of FLTRT was that those firms that had 
previously received the benefit of FLTRT had to pay tax at a higher rate starting from 
2002, that is, their tax rate increased from 15% to 33%, while the tax rate for the 
other firms that were not covered by FLTRT remained unchanged. However, the new 
rule was announced in late 2000, although it did not become effective until 2002. 
Therefore, those firms that were affected by the new rule had sufficient time to 
manage their earnings in 2001 and 2002 to lower their tax burden.  
Since firm performance is closely related to the ability and effort of the firm’s 
management team, the firm’s owner can use, and has been widely using, the firm’s 
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performance to evaluate the management team (Holmstrom 1979; Ittner and Larcker 
1998), and accordingly to determine the management team’s compensation, 
promotion, and even continuation of employment. This is true for both 
privately-controlled and state-controlled firms. Even though in China, 
state-controlled firms sometimes have other goals such as increasing employment 
and maintaining social stability, profit maximization is always one of the most 
important goals for the management team. The State-Owned Enterprises Evaluation 
Guidelines, which was published by the Chinese government in 1993, 1995 and 
1999 respectively, all explicitly require that the evaluation be based on the firm’s 
economic performance. Empirical studies also find that in China, the firms’ 
economic performance significantly affected the management’s compensation 
(Groves et al. 1995) and their turnover (Chang and Wong 2009). Therefore, FLTRT 
firms had an incentive to manage their earnings to lower their tax burden. 
The termination of FLTRT provided both the incentive and sufficient time for 
the affected firms to manage earnings. However, this does not mean that the firm 
would actually do so. There are two reasons. The first reason concerns whether the 
planned goal of reducing the amount of tax payment could be achieved. Even if the 
firm managed its earnings, the tax authority might not levy a tax based on the 
managed earnings as it had the power to levy a tax using other reasonable earnings. 
As a result, TEM might not achieve the intended goal. The second reason is the cost 
associated with earnings management. All listed companies are subject to 
supervision from the securities regulatory committee and tax authority. TEM violates 
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the information disclosure rule of securities regulations and lowers tax payment. 
Hence, once the TEM is discovered, the firm faces severe punishment from both the 
securities regulatory committee and tax authority. The punishment, or even the 
incident itself, dramatically damages the firm’s value. Therefore, TEM might not be 
an optimal strategy for some listed firms. It would be optimal only for those firms 
with the ability to lower their tax burden and avoid punishment. Firms with 
politically connected management might belong to the latter category. In China, both 
the securities regulatory committee and tax authority are parts of the government. 
The CEO’s political affiliation can help the firm lower its tax burden through 
earnings management and avoid punishment. Therefore, we propose the following 
hypothesis. 
Hypothesis 1: FLTRT firms with politically connected management would 
manage earnings in response to the tax rate change, while FLTRT firms without 
politically connected management would not engage in tax-induced earnings 
management. 
Firms with politically connected management would engage in TEM. Their 
political connections would enable these firms to pay tax based on their managed 
earnings, and their tax burden would be lowered as the reported earnings were 
lowered. For those firms that did not engage in TEM, the tax they paid was based on 
their true earnings. The reported earnings would be true earnings for non-earnings 
management firms, and managed earnings for earnings management firms. Thus, all 
firms (both with and without earnings management) paid tax according to their 
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reported earnings, so the effective tax rate calculated as the ratio of tax payment over 
reported earnings would not have differed between groups with and without earnings 
management. Hence, we propose the following hypothesis. 
Hypothesis 2: The tax-induced earnings management by FLTRT firms with 
political connections would help the firms to lower their tax burden. The 
reported effective tax rate would be independent of the level of earnings 
management. 
 
3. Research design 
3.1. Models and variables  
To facilitate our analysis, we classify the firms into four groups based on their 
tax and political connection status as follows. 
Illustration 1 
     With FLTRT  Without FLTRT 
With PC  Group 1 (G1)  Group 3 (G3) 
Without PC Group 2 (G2)  Group 4 (G4) 
G1 firms had both FLTRT and political connections and therefore had both the 
incentive and capability to manage earnings in response to the tax rate change. G2 
firms had FLTRT but did not have political connections, that is, they had the 
incentive to engage in TEM, but did not have the capability to do so. Since G3 firms 
did not have FLTRT but had political connections, they did not have the incentive to 
engage in TEM, although they had the capability to do so. Finally, as G4 firms had 
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neither FLTRT nor political connections, they had neither the incentive nor the 
capability to engage in TEM. Thus, we use G4 firms as the benchmark.  
To test Hypothesis 1, we examine whether the level of earnings management is 
significantly different from zero for G1 firms in year 2002.2 Furthermore, we can 
compare earnings management among the four groups in different years, and see 
especially whether there is a difference between the earnings management of G1 and 
G4 in 2002. So we need to calculate the magnitude of earnings management for each 
firm. Following Dechow, Sloan and Sweeney (1995), we employ the modified Jones 
model to calculate discretionary total accruals (DTAC) which is the measure for 
earnings management. Thus, the model for nondiscretionary accruals (NDA) is 
0 1 2 31(1/ ) ( ) ( )t t t t tNDA A REV REC PPE   
   
      ,              (1) 
where At-1 is the total assets at year t-1; △REVt is the revenues in year t less the 
revenues in year t-1 scaled by the total assets at year t-1; △RECt is the net 
receivables in year t less the net receivables in year t-1 scaled by the total assets at 
year t-1; PPEt is the gross property and equipment in year t scaled by the total assets 
at year t-1; and 0 1 2, ,  
  
, and 3

 are the parameter estimates of the following 
regression model: 
0 1 1 2 3(1/ ) ( ) ( )t t t t tTA A REV PPE          ,                     (2) 
where TA is the total accruals scaled by the lagged total assets. Total accruals are 
                                                        
2 It is true that taxable income and book income are different in China. Taxable income is based on the tax law 
and the book income is based on the accounting standards. However, their quantitative difference is very small 
because of the following reasons. (1) Both taxable income and book income are accruals-based. (2) Taxable 
income is based on the tax law, but the law does not give a specific definition for many incomes and the 
accounting standard is used to calculate the taxable income, for example, the difference between costs of finished 
goods inventory and costs of work-in-process inventory. (3) In reality, the taxable income is usually calculated 
through adjusting the book income, and the adjustment is usually small. For most of the public firms in China, 
there are no deferred tax assets and deferred tax liabilities in their balance sheets, and the underlying reason is 
that the taxable income is equal to the book income. 
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computed as 
t t t t t tTA CA CL Cash STD Dep      ,                         (3) 
where △CAt is the change in current assets in year t scaled by the total assets at year 
t-1; △CLt is the change in current liabilities in year t scaled by the total assets at 
year t-1; △Casht is the change in cash and cash equivalents in year t scaled by the 
total assets at year t-1; △STDt is the change in debt included in the current liabilities 
in year t scaled by the total assets at year t-1; and Dept is the depreciation and 
amortization expense in year t scaled by the total assets at year t-1. Combining 
equations (1), (2), and (3), we can subtract the nondiscretionary accruals (NDA) from 
the total accruals to get the discretionary accruals (MDA) of the modified Jones 
model. 
Model (2) is run using all listed company samples by year and industry. Because 
approximately half of Chinese listed companies are in the manufacturing industry, 
we use a two-digit code (according to the Chinese Listed Company Classification) to 
classify manufacturing companies, while we use a one-digit code to classify firms in 
other industries. 
To control for other factors, we run the following ordinary least square (OLS) 
regression model: 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
8 9 10 11 12 13
14 15
1 2 3 1 1 1 1 2 1 3
2 2 1 2 2 2 3 3 3 1
3 2 3 3 i i
MDA Y Y Y G G Y G Y G Y
G G Y G Y G Y G G Y
G Y G Y Control Var
       
     
   
       
     
   
,     (4) 
where MDA is the level of earnings management of a firm, which is calculated above. 
G1, G2, and G3 are the dummy variables for different groups of firms. If a firm was 
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an FLTRT firm and had politically connected management, then G1 equals 1, and 0 
otherwise. If a firm was an FLTRT firm but did not have politically connected 
management, then G2 equals 1, and 0 otherwise. If a firm was not an FLTRT firm 
but had politically connected management, then G3 equals 1, and 0 otherwise. 
Following Fan, Wong, and Zhang (2007), politically connected management is 
defined as the CEO (and/or board chairman) of a firm serving as a current or former 
officer of the government. To determine CEOs’ political connections, we collect their 
CVs from the sample firms’ annual reports and other data sources, including the Sina 
Finance database. The information in these CVs includes the CEOs’ gender, age, 
level of education, and current and previous occupations. After reading the CVs 
carefully, we define a firm as politically connected if its CEO is a current or former 
government bureaucrat of any of four types: an officer in the government, a member 
of the People’s Congress, a member of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative 
Conference or an officer in the military. 
According to Hypothesis 1, firms with politically connected management would 
engage in TEM when the tax rate changes. Because the Chinese central government 
announced in 2000 that the termination of FLTRT would take effect in 2002, FLTRT 
firms knew that their tax rate would remain unchanged in 2001 and increase in 2002. 
From the tax rate change perspective only, one possible scenario is that FLTRT firms 
would move some of their earnings from 2002 to 2001 to take advantage of the 
lower tax rate in 2001. However, such a practice would require the firms to pay tax 
at an earlier time, which would constitute a cost for the firms. Furthermore, 
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managing earnings upward was under strict supervision from the securities 
regulatory committee. Even if a firm had political connections, this activity was still 
potentially risky for the firm. Hence, it is unclear whether there would be significant 
upward earnings management in 2001, but significant downward earnings 
management in 2002 is expected. To implement this test, we define three dummy 
variables to handle different years for regression model (4). If the observation year is 
2001, then Y1 equals 1, and 0 otherwise. If the observation year is 2002, then Y2 
equals 1, and 0 otherwise. If the observation year is after 2002, then Y3 equals 1, and 
0 otherwise. GiYj is the interaction term of Gi and Yj (i = 1,2,3; j = 1,2,3). We expect 
that the estimated parameter for G1Y2 will be significantly negative, and that all of 
the other parameters associated with a yearly dummy and/or group dummy will not 
be significant. 
In addition, following previous studies, we include the following control 
variables in regression model (4). 
SIZE is the natural logarithm of the year-end total assets of the current year. 
There are two different views on the relationship between firm size and earnings 
management: (1) large firms are less likely to engage in earnings management as 
they are subject to more supervision from the government (Guenther 1994); and (2) 
large firms have greater lobbying power in the government and thus are more likely 
to engage in earnings management (Scholes, Wilson and Wolfson 1992). Hence, the 
direction of size effect on earnings management is unclear. 
LEV is the year-end leverage of the current year, which is defined as the 
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long-term liabilities divided by the total assets. One of the important motives for 
firms to manage their earnings is to raise finance; therefore, firms with higher 
leverage are more likely to engage in earnings management (Guenther 1994). 
However, high leverage means that the firm has already raised finance through debt 
and thus does not have the motivation to manage earnings so that the performance 
looks better to raise debt. Hence, the sign of the parameter for leverage in the 
regression model is also uncertain. 
ROA is the return on assets of the current year, which is defined as the earnings 
before tax divided by the total assets. Accruals constitute a component of earnings. 
Firms with a high level of earnings tend to have a high level of discretionary accruals 
(Dechow, Sloan and Sweeney 1995). To control for the effect of firm performance on 
discretionary accruals, we employ ROA as a control variable. Lei and Liu (2006) find 
a similarly positive relationship between ROA and earnings management, although 
Mitra and Cready (2005) find this relationship to be insignificant. 
OCF is operation cash flow which is defined as the year-end operation cash 
flow divided by total assets. There are two channels through which managers 
manage earnings, i.e., accruals and cash flows. More cash flows means higher 
possibility of managing earnings through cash flows, and lower possibility of 
managing earnings through accruals. However, Chung and Kallapur (2003) find that 
the correlation between cash flow and level of earnings management can be either 
positive or negative. 
MB is a measure of corporate investment opportunity which is measured by the 
 17 
year-end market value over book value. Skinner and Sloan (2002) find that growth 
stocks experience a disproportionately large negative stock price response to earnings 
disappointments (the ‘torpedo’ effect). Similarly, Dechow, Richardson, and Tuna 
(2000) find that high growth firms have incentives to manage earnings upwards to 
avoid earnings disappointments. Consistent with Skinner and Sloan (2002), Dechow, 
Richardson, and Tuna (2000) and Koh (2007), we use MB to capture the ‘torpedo’ 
effect. This also controls for the relation between discretionary accruals and growth 
options (McNichols 2000). 
AL and AD are two dummy variables which represent managing earnings to 
avoid loss and avoid earnings decreases, respectively. If ROE is positive but less than 
0.01, then AL equals 1, and 0 otherwise. ROE is the return on equity of the current 
year, which is defined as net earnings divided by the year-end equity. If DROE is 
positive but less than 0.01, then AD equals 1, and 0 otherwise. DROE is the change of 
ROE of the current year. Avoiding loss and/or avoiding earnings decrease is one of the 
most important reasons for firms to manage their earnings (Sloan 1996; Burgstahler 
and Dichev 1997; Degeorge, Patel and Zeckhauser 1999). This is also true for Chinese 
listed companies. Wang et al. (2008) find that around 20% of listed firms manage 
earnings to avoid loss and 6% of listed firms to avoid earnings decrease in China. 
PIND is a dummy variable for firms in protected industries. Some industries, 
because of strategic or other reasons, are under special protection from the 
government. The probability of earnings management by these firms is smaller 
(Aharony, Lee and Wong 2000). Based on the definition of protected industries in 
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Aharony, Lee, and Wong (2000), we classify the raw materials, chemistry, and 
energy industries as protected industries. If a firm is in a protected industry, then 
PIND equals 1, and 0 otherwise. The sign of the PIND parameter in the regression is 
expected to be negative. 
AUD is a dummy variable for the type of audit firm hired by the listed company. 
If the audit firm is one of the Big Four, AUD equals 1, and 0 otherwise. Extant 
studies show that the type of audit firm hired by the listed company has an effect on 
the quality of the financial report. Becker et al. (1998) show that those firms which 
hired non-Big Four audit firms tend to have larger earnings management. 
OPIN is a dummy variable for the type of audit opinion. If the audit opinion is 
unqualified, OPIN equals 1, and 0 otherwise. Bartov, Gul, and Tsui (2000) find that 
the discretionary accruals is significantly positively related to qualified audit 
opinion. 
CROSS is a dummy variable for cross listing. If the firm has H shares, then 
CROSS equals 1, and 0 otherwise. Since cross-listed firms have better corporate 
governance, we expected them to have lower level of earnings management. 
Regional development imbalance is an important feature in the Chinese 
economy, which affects the enforcement of the tax law and regional ETR difference. 
Therefore, we also control for region effect in model (4). 
Hypothesis 2 is based on Hypothesis 1. If Hypothesis 1 holds, then FLTRT 
firms with politically connected management would engage in TEM in 2002, while 
FLTRT firms without politically connected management would not because they 
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could not. Hypothesis 2 examines whether earnings management can help those 
politically connected firms to reduce their tax burden. We cannot compare the 
effective tax rates of FLTRT firms with those of non-FLTRT firms because the tax 
rates of FLTRT firms changed. To test the hypothesis, we run the following 
regression model using only the observations of FLTRT firms. 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
8
1 2 3 1 1 1 1 2 1 3
i i
ETR Y Y Y G G Y G Y G Y
MDA Control Var
       
  
       
  
,        (5) 
where ETR is the reported effective tax rate, a common proxy for the corporate tax 
burden (Porcano 1986; Shevlin and Porter 1992; Gupta and Newberry 1997). The 
ETR is defined as the ratio of tax expense over profit before interest and tax 
(Porcano 1986). Dummy variables or interaction terms G1, Y1, Y2, Y3, G1Y1, G1Y2, 
and G1Y3 are defined as those in equation (1). MDA is the discretionary accruals of a 
firm, which is calculated above. The tax burden of a firm is lowered as long as the 
reported earnings are less than the unobservable actual earnings. However, the 
reported ETR is calculated using the reported earnings. Hence, if G1 firms failed to 
reduce their tax payment, that is, they paid their tax according to a higher earnings 
base, then the ETR for these firms would be higher. Hypothesis 2 says that G1 firms 
would successfully reduce their tax; therefore, we should not observe any additional 
increase in ETR for G1 firms in 2002. The parameter of G1Y2 in the regression is 
thus expected to be insignificant. Also, Hypothesis 2 predicts that ETR was 
independent of the level of earnings management, so the parameter of MDA in the 
regression is also expected to be insignificant. 
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Based on previous studies, we also control for size, leverage, capital intensity, 
inventory intensity, profitability, and investment opportunity. SIZE is measured by 
the natural logarithm of the year-end total assets of the current year. There are two 
different views regarding the relationship between firm size and ETR: (1) large firms 
are subject to greater public scrutiny and as a result, incur a “political cost” in the 
form of a higher ETR (e.g., Zimmerman 1983); and (2) large firms pay less tax 
because they can devote more resources to tax planning and political lobbying (e.g., 
Siegfried 1972).  
Leverage (LEV) is the year-end leverage of the current year, which is defined as 
the long-term liabilities divided by the total assets. As interest expenses are 
deductible for tax purposes in China, firms with higher leverage should have a lower 
ETR. Alternatively, a positive relation between ETR and leverage is possible if firms 
with high marginal tax rates are more likely to use debt financing. 
Profitability (ROA) is defined as earnings before tax divided by the year-end 
total assets of the current year. ETR is a function of the ratio of tax privileges to 
pre-tax accounting income. Due to the imperfect correlation between tax privileges 
and pre-tax accounting income, ROA affects ETR. Specifically, when tax privileges 
are positive, i.e., taxable income is less than pre-tax accounting income, ROA and 
ETR are positively correlated (Wilkie 1988). However, tax privileges may also be 
negative, resulting in a negative correlation between ROA and ETR. 
Capital intensity (CAPINT) and inventory intensity (INVINT) are the year-end 
asset mix of the current year (Gupta and Newberry 1997). CAPINT is defined as the 
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net fixed assets divided by the total assets, and INVINT is defined as the inventory 
divided by the total assets. Capital intensity may reduce a firm’s ETR because of 
tax-deductible accelerated depreciation relative to the actual asset lives, while 
inventory intensity is a substitute for capital intensity and should be positively 
correlated with the ETR (Gupta and Newberry 1997). 
Investment opportunity (MB) is defined as the ratio of the year-end market 
value to the book value of the current year. Growth firms may be those to which the 
government gives more support and levies less tax on the basis of their perceived 
potential for economic growth. In addition, future growth may imply high 
investment and operating costs that could lead to less taxable income and, 
consequently, a lower ETR. 
 
3.2. Data and sample selection 
The tax event examined in this paper is the termination of FLTRT starting in 
2002, which was announced in 2000. We are interested in the TEM motivated by this 
event, so we use the data of listed companies from 1999 to 2005. However, for the 
sample from 2001 to 2005, we exclude all publicly traded firms registered in western, 
central, and northeast China, because the West China Development Project, launched 
in 2001, provided various tax incentives to attract investment to the western and 
central regions. This policy caused a change in the tax rates from 2001 for 
companies located in western and central China. The Chinese government also set 
more preferential tax policies for listed firms in northeast China from 2001. Hence, 
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our sample from 2001 to 2005 includes firms in Beijing, Tianjin, Hebei, Shandong, 
Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Fujian, Guangdong, Shanghai, and Hainan. Although we include 
less than one-third of the provinces and autonomous districts,3 these regions play the 
most significant role in the Chinese economy. In addition, we delete some 
observations for the following reasons: (1) firms in the financial industry whose  
accounting standards are quite different from those for non-financial industries; (2) 
all observations in a year-industry group with the number of observations less than 
10 as we need to run regressions on samples by year-industry when using the 
modified Jones model to calculate discretionary accruals accurately (model 2); (3) 
firms going public in the current year as we need the accounting information of the 
previous year; (4) observations with missing values in key variables; and (5) extreme 
observations. After the discretionary accruals are calculated, we consider those 
observations with MDAs lying outside three standard deviations as outliers. 
We manually collected the political connection data from the annual reports of 
firms. The data source for depreciation and amortization expense is the China Stock 
Market and Accounting Research (CSMAR) database. All other data come from the 
SinoFin Financial Information Service database. 
 
4. Empirical results 
Table 1 reports the sample distribution. The total number of observations from 
1999 to 2005 is 3581. Among them, the number of firm-year observations in G1, G2, 
                                                        
3 There were 27 provinces and four autonomous districts in China during the period from 1999 to 2005.  
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G3, and G4 are 172, 1001, 422, and 1986, respectively. The yearly distribution 
shows that the number of the observations increases over time. This is consistent 
with the growth of the Chinese stock market. The number of observations for 2001 is 
less than that for 2000, because we exclude firms registered in western, northeast, 
and central China from 2001. 
Insert Table 1 Here 
Table 2 presents the descriptive statistics. For the whole sample, the mean 
(median) of MDA is 0.0035 (0.0084). The mean of SIZE is 21.1831. There is large 
variation in the firm leverages (LEV) – the maximum is 3.0924 and the minimum is 
-0.1046. The average leverage is 0.0643. There is also large variation in ROA, from – 
13.0837 to 0.4555 – which means that listed Chinese companies differ greatly in 
their profitability. Under government protection (PIND) is 25.89% of firms. More 
than 9% of the firms hired the Big Four audit firms (AUD), and about 93% of the 
firms got unqualified audit opinions (OPIN). The descriptive statistics of the four 
groups show that they have similar firm characteristics. 
Insert Table 2 Here 
In Table 3, we examine whether the MDAs are significantly different from zero 
for every group, and compare MDAs among the different groups. The mean and 
median of MDA for G1 firms in 2002 are -0.0525 and -0.0741, respectively. Both are 
significantly negative. The mean and median of MDA for G4 firms are 0.0029 and 
0.0067, respectively, which are not significant. The mean and median of MDA for 
G1 firms in 2002 are both significantly lower than those of G4 firms. There is no 
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significant difference in the mean or median of MDA between G1 firms and G4 
firms in other years. This indicates that G1 firms managed earnings downward in 
response to the termination of FLTRT, which took effect in 2002. Because of the 
increase of the tax rate, those affected firms with the ability to engage in TEM 
lowered their earnings in 2002 so that they would pay less tax. There is no 
significant difference in MDA between G2 firms and G4 firms in all years. This 
shows that G2 firms had an incentive to manage earnings downward, but they had no 
capability to do so. There is also no significant difference in MDA between G3 firms 
and G4 firms in all years. This shows that neither G3 firms nor G4 firms were 
affected by the termination of FLTRT, and that neither had an incentive to manage 
earnings. 
Insert Table 3 Here 
Table 4 reports the regression results of TEM. As expected, except for the 
interaction term of G1 and Y2, all of the other group dummy variables, year dummy 
variables, and their interaction terms are not significant. The interaction term of G1 
and Y2 is significantly negative, which means that firms affected by the higher tax 
rate and having politically connected management engaged in earnings management 
to lower their earnings in 2002. G2 firms faced higher tax rates, but lacked the ability 
of influencing tax authorities; therefore, we cannot observe significant regression 
parameters of G2Y2. As G3 firms were not affected by the termination of FLTRT and 
they did not have an incentive to manage earnings, the coefficient of G3Y2 is also 
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insignificant. The above results confirm Hypothesis 1.4 The parameter estimates for 
the control variables in the regression are all reasonable. The coefficient for LEV is 
significantly positive, which means that firms engage in earnings management to 
raise finance. As expected, the parameter of firm performance, ROA, is significantly 
positive. This is consistent with the results in Lei and Liu (2006). The coefficient for 
OCF is significantly negative, which is the same as that in Chung and Kallapur 
(2003). 
Insert Table 4 Here 
The results in Table 4 confirm that FLTRT firms with politically connected 
management managed earnings downward in 2002 in response to the tax rate change, 
while other firms did not engage in TEM. Next, we examine whether FLTRT firms 
with politically connected management did eventually manage to lower their tax 
burden. To obtain a meaningful measure of ETR, we refine the sample used above as 
follows: (1) we delete observations with a negative denominator (used as the scale 
for the effective tax rate, in our base case, it is profit before interest and tax); (2) we 
let ETR equal zero if it is less than zero, and let it equal one if it is larger than one, 
similar to Zimmerman (1983). Also, we only keep the observations of FLTRT firms 
because it is not possible to compare FLTRT firm ETRs with non-FLTRT firm ETRs. 
In the end, we have 1056 firm-year observations. The number of firm-year 
observations in G1 and G2 are 157 and 899, respectively. The detailed distribution is 
presented in Table 5. 
                                                        
4 When we divide the sample into two sub-samples by the median of ROA, we find that the relation between 
political connections and earnings management among FLTRT firms is more pronounced in firms with good 
performance. 
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Insert Table 5 Here 
Table 6 presents the regression results on the economic consequences of TEM. 
As expected, the coefficient of G1Y2 is insignificant, which means there is no 
evidence to show that there is any additional increase in the reported ETRs for G1 
firms in 2002. Also, the magnitude of earnings management (MDA) does not 
significantly affect the reported ETRs. These results suggest that G1 firms did pay 
their tax according to their reported earnings in 2002 when they managed earnings 
downward. Hence, TEM did reduce the tax burden of those firms that engaged in 
earnings management in 2002. The insignificant coefficients of G1Y2 and MDA 
support Hypothesis 2. The coefficients of G1Y1 and G1Y3 are insignificant, which 
means G1 firms paid tax according to the reported actual earnings in 2001 and 2003 
when they did not manage earnings. The estimated parameters of Y2 and Y3 are both 
significantly positive, which means all firms paid more tax starting from 2002. This 
is because FLTRT was terminated, and the nominal tax rate was increased from 15% 
to 33% for G1 firms and G2 firms. The coefficient of Y1 is insignificant because the 
nominal tax rate remained unchanged in 2001. As for the control variables, the 
parameters for ROA and INVINT are significantly positive, a finding consistent with 
that reported in Gupta and Newberry (1997). The estimated coefficient of MB is 
significantly negative at the 1% level, and the coefficients of SIZE, LEV and 
CAPINT are insignificant. 
Insert Table 6 Here 
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5. Robustness checks 
To check the robustness of our results, we conduct the following additional tests. 
First, we use an alternative proxy of earnings management. In Section 3, we 
used the sales changes net of the change in accounts receivable in the modified Jones 
model to calculate discretionary accruals. Here, we also follow previous studies and 
subtract the change in accounts receivable from the sales changes in model (2), that 
is, equation (2) is replaced by 
0 1 1 2 3(1/ ) ( ) ( )t t t t t tTA A REV REC PPE           .              (2’) 
The other calculations are the same as those in Section 3. In addition, following the 
Jones model (Jones 1991), we do not consider the change in accounts receivable, that 
is, we replace equation (1) using 
0 1 2 31(1/ ) ( ) ( )t t t tNDA A REV PPE   
   
     .                     (1’) 
The results based on these measurements of earnings management are qualitatively 
similar. Finally, following previous studies, we do not use the intercept term in the 
modified Jones model, and get similar results. 
Second, we adopt alternative proxies of ETR. In Section 3, ETR was defined as 
tax expense/profit before interest and tax. We also use the following three measures: 
(1) ETR2 = (tax expense-deferred tax expense)/profit before interest and tax (Porcano 
1986); ETR3 = (tax expense)/(profit before interest and tax-(deferred tax 
expense/statutory tax rate)) (Stickney and McGee 1982); ETR4 = (tax 
expense-deferred tax expense)/(profit before interest and tax-(deferred tax 
expense/statutory tax rate)) (Shevlin 1987). All of these methods produce similar 
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results.  
Third, we use alternative ways to deal with extreme values. In Section 3, we 
consider those observations with MDAs lying outside three standard deviations as 
outliers. We also try deleting the upper and lower 1% of observations according to 
the MDAs. The results are qualitatively similar. In addition, the sample used in 
Section 3 includes the observations with leverage (LEV) less than 0. We delete those 
observations and repeat the studies, and we get the same results. 
 
6. Conclusion 
The extant studies on TEM mainly consider the tax reform in the United States 
in 1986. The reform lowered the tax rate for all companies. There is no evidence 
whether firms engage in earnings management when tax rates are increased. Also, 
the studies do not consider the capability of companies to achieve the goal of 
earnings management. When the tax rate changes, although all affected companies 
are motivated to manage earnings, some firms are not capable of achieving the goal 
of earnings management. Furthermore, whether TEM actually helps firms to reduce 
their tax payment is still an open question. In this paper, we use the termination of 
the FLTRT policy in China, which raised the tax rate for some listed companies in 
China starting from 2002, to examine TEM activity. We provide evidence of the 
effects of capability of achieving the goal of earnings management on firms’ 
earnings management behavior and the economic consequences of TEM. Moreover, 
although it provides evidence that political connections affect firm value, the extant 
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research pays little attention to the underlying mechanism or channel. This paper 
provides direct evidence that political connections reduced firm’s tax burden through 
earnings management. 
We find that when the tax rate changed, only those affected firms with 
politically connected management engaged in TEM. This is because their political 
connections could help the firms achieve the goal of reducing their tax burden and 
avoid being punished. We also find that TEM did actually help these firms reduce 
their tax burden. This finding helps us better understand TEM. It also illustrates an 
underlying mechanism through which political connections affect firm value. 
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Table 1. Sample distribution. 
 G1 G2 G3 G4 Total 
1999 18 96 77 269 460 
2000 25 119 93 339 576 
2001 24 137 41 167 369 
2002 22 147 45 220 434 
2003 27 157 49 278 511 
2004 28 167 55 324 574 
2005 28 178 62 389 657 
Total 172 1,001 422 1,986 3,581 
Notes: G1 firms are firms that had both FLTRT and politically connected management. G2 firms are firms that had 
FLTRT, but didn’t have politically connected management. G3 firms are firms that didn’t have FLTRT, but had 
politically connected management. G4 firms are firms that had neither FLTRT nor politically connected 
management. 
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Table 2. Descriptive statistics. 
 Mean Median 
Standard 
deviation Maximum Minimum 
Panel A: Full sample (n=3,581) 
MDA 0.0035  0.0084  0.1143  0.4438  -0.4213  
SIZE 21.1831  21.0910  0.9701  25.7343  17.0612  
LEV 0.0643  0.0222  0.1302  3.0924  -0.1046  
ROA 0.0246  0.0433  0.3212  0.4555  -13.0837  
OCF 0.0496  0.0488  0.0870  0.7522  -0.6556  
MB 3.9879  2.9849  14.3090  252.8548  -572.6531  
AL 0.0639  0.0000  0.2447  1.0000  0.0000  
AD 0.1667  0.0000  0.3728  1.0000  0.0000  
PIND 0.2589  0.0000  0.4381  1.0000  0.0000  
AUD 0.0902  0.0000  0.2865  1.0000  0.0000  
OPIN 0.9277  1.0000  0.2591  1.0000  0.0000  
CROSS 0.0310  0.0000  0.1733  1.0000  0.0000  
Panel B: G1 firms (n=172) 
MDA -0.0031  0.0001  0.1170  0.3518  -0.4081  
SIZE 21.2149  21.1741  0.8339  23.0136  18.6019  
LEV 0.0508  0.0313  0.0615  0.2974  -0.0229  
ROA 0.0338  0.0392  0.0675  0.4555  -0.3172  
OCF 0.0470  0.0556  0.0782  0.3626  -0.2394  
MB 6.1375  2.7086  26.4540  252.8548  -14.7059  
AL 0.0756  0.0000  0.2651  1.0000  0.0000  
AD 0.1453  0.0000  0.3535  1.0000  0.0000  
PIND 0.1163  0.0000  0.3215  1.0000  0.0000  
AUD 0.0465  0.0000  0.2112  1.0000  0.0000  
OPIN 0.9477  1.0000  0.2233  1.0000  0.0000  
CROSS 0.0407  0.0000  0.1982  1.0000  0.0000  
Panel C: G2 firms (n=1,001) 
MDA 0.0037  0.0078  0.1113  0.4026  -0.3825  
SIZE 21.1756  21.1541  0.8223  23.9232  17.0612  
LEV 0.0605  0.0213  0.0885  0.5804  -0.0421  
ROA 0.0211  0.0412  0.3793  0.3022  -11.6742  
OCF 0.0544  0.0542  0.0805  0.5627  -0.6556  
MB 3.2085  2.6501  19.1273  98.6639  -572.6531  
AL 0.0539  0.0000  0.2260  1.0000  0.0000  
AD 0.1628  0.0000  0.3694  1.0000  0.0000  
PIND 0.2747  0.0000  0.4466  1.0000  0.0000  
AUD 0.0370  0.0000  0.1888  1.0000  0.0000  
OPIN 0.9341  1.0000  0.2483  1.0000  0.0000  
CROSS 0.0050  0.0000  0.0705  1.0000  0.0000  
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Panel D: G3 firms (n=422) 
MDA 0.0087  0.0127  0.1172  0.3213  -0.4182  
SIZE 21.4555  21.2793  1.2156  25.7343  17.9674  
LEV 0.0907  0.0257  0.2178  3.0924  -0.1046  
ROA 0.0386  0.0471  0.1142  0.2625  -1.7092  
OCF 0.0512  0.0529  0.0974  0.7435  -0.2974  
MB 3.7548  3.5109  17.6229  122.4444  -309.6296  
AL 0.0521  0.0000  0.2226  1.0000  0.0000  
AD 0.1825  0.0000  0.3867  1.0000  0.0000  
PIND 0.1754  0.0000  0.3807  1.0000  0.0000  
AUD 0.1445  0.0000  0.3521  1.0000  0.0000  
OPIN 0.9265  1.0000  0.2612  1.0000  0.0000  
CROSS 0.0474  0.0000  0.2127  1.0000  0.0000  
Panel E: G4 firms (n=1,986) 
MDA 0.0029  0.0086  0.1150  0.4438  -0.4213  
SIZE 21.1262  21.0157  0.9819  25.6793  17.3894  
LEV 0.0617  0.0207  0.1267  2.3233  -0.0383  
ROA 0.0225  0.0443  0.3323  0.4448  -13.0837  
OCF 0.0470  0.0439  0.0885  0.7522  -0.4561  
MB 4.2441  3.0947  7.6172  173.5714  -54.8361  
AL 0.0705  0.0000  0.2560  1.0000  0.0000  
AD 0.1672  0.0000  0.3732  1.0000  0.0000  
PIND 0.2810  0.0000  0.4496  1.0000  0.0000  
AUD 0.1093  0.0000  0.3120  1.0000  0.0000  
OPIN 0.9230  1.0000  0.2667  1.0000  0.0000  
CROSS 0.0398  0.0000  0.1955  1.0000  0.0000  
Notes: MDA is the level of earnings management, which is calculated using the modified Jones model. SIZE is the 
natural logarithm of the year-end total assets of the current year. LEV is the year-end leverage of the current year, 
which is defined as long-term liabilities divided by total assets. ROA is defined as earnings before tax divided by 
the year-end total assets. OCF is defined as the year-end operation cash flow divided by total assets. MB is the 
year-end market value over book value. If ROE is positive but less than 0.01, then AL equals 1, and 0 otherwise. 
ROE is net earnings divided by the year-end equity. If DROE is positive but less than 0.01, then AD equals 1, and 0 
otherwise. DROE is the change of ROE of the current year. If a firm is in a protected industry, then PIND equals1, 
and 0 otherwise. If the audit firm hired by the listed company is one of the Big Four, AUD equals 1, and 0 
otherwise. If the audit opinion is unqualified, OPIN equals 1, and 0 otherwise. If the firm has H shares, then 
CROSS equals 1, and 0 otherwise. G1 firms are firms that had both FLTRT and politically connected management. 
G2 firms are firms that had FLTRT, but didn’t have politically connected management. G3 firms are firms that 
didn’t have FLTRT, but had politically connected management. G4 firms are firms that had neither FLTRT nor 
politically connected management.  
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Table 3. Comparisons of earnings management between different groups. 
 G1 G2 G3 G4 G1-G4 G2-G4 G3-G4 
Panel A: Mean of MDA 
1999-2001 0.0203 
(1.26) 
0.0112 
(1.69) 
0.0132 
(1.54) 
0.0009 
(0.21) 
0.0194 
(1.21) 
0.0103 
(1.28) 
0.0123 
(1.26) 
2001 0.0124 
(0.41) 
0.0062 
(0.56) 
-0.0057 
(-0.27) 
-0.0081 
(-0.72) 
0.0205 
 (0.64) 
0.0143 
(0.91) 
0.0024 
(0.10) 
2002 -0.0525 
(-2.48)** 
0.0070 
(0.78) 
-0.0111 
(-0.67) 
0.0029 
(0.41) 
-0.0554 
(-2.39)** 
0.0041 
(0.36) 
-0.0140 
(-0.81) 
2003 0.0028 
(0.14) 
-0.0127 
(-1.51) 
-0.0116 
(-0.60) 
0.0034 
(0.49) 
-0.0006 
(-0.03) 
-0.0161 
(-1.47) 
-0.0150 
(-0.81) 
2003-2005 -0.0088 
(-0.77) 
-0.0025 
(-0.54) 
0.0083 
(0.97) 
0.0044 
(1.28) 
-0.0132 
(-1.07) 
-0.0069 
(-1.21) 
0.0039 
(0.43) 
Panel B: Median of MDA 
1999-2001 0.0241 
(266)* 
0.0172 
(4543)** 
0.0122 
(1642)* 
0.0065 
(5921) 
0.0176 
(1.40) 
0.0107 
(1.39) 
0.0057 
(1.22) 
2001 0.0352 
(25) 
0.0105 
(583.5) 
-0.0033 
(-19.5) 
0.0062 
(-131) 
0.0290 
(0.87) 
0.0043 
(0.82) 
-0.0095 
(-0.07) 
2002 -0.0741 
(-71.5)** 
0.0083 
(508) 
0.0122 
(-22.5) 
0.0067 
(540) 
-0.0808 
(-2.56)** 
0.0016 
(0.44) 
0.0055 
(0.38) 
2003 -0.0041 
(-1) 
-0.0002 
(-490.5) 
0.0029 
(-29.5) 
0.0093 
(1046.5) 
-0.0134 
(-0.23) 
-0.0095 
(-1.24) 
-0.0064 
(-0.67) 
2003-2005 -0.0008 
(-119) 
0.0016 
(284.5) 
0.0154 
(1024.5)* 
0.0119 
(18220)** 
-0.0127 
(-1.14) 
-0.0103 
(-1.24) 
0.0035 
(0.55) 
Notes: MDA is the level of earnings management, which is calculated using the modified Jones model. The values 
in the parentheses are statistics. The first four columns test the mean or median of MDAs for four groups. The test 
method for mean is t-test. The test method for median is the nonparametric Wilcoxon signed-rank test. The other 
three columns test the differences in mean or median of MDA between groups. The significance of the differences 
in means is measured using t-statistics. The difference in medians is tested using the nonparametric Wilcoxon 
rank-sums test. 
***: significant at the 1% level; **: significant at the 5% level; *: significant at the 10% level. 
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Table 4. The effect of FLTRT and political connection on earnings management. 
 Estimate t value 
Intercept -0.0043  -0.10  
Y1 0.0017  0.16  
Y2 0.0034  0.35  
Y3 0.0017  0.23  
G1 0.0255  1.42  
G1Y1 -0.0161  -0.54  
G1Y2 -0.0827***  -2.73  
G1Y3 -0.0355  -1.63  
G2 0.0146  1.45  
G2Y1 -0.0085  -0.53  
G2Y2 -0.0083  -0.54  
G2Y3 -0.0152  -1.31  
G3 0.0099  1.04  
G3Y1 -0.0159  -0.75  
G3Y2 -0.0207  -1.02  
G3Y3 -0.0048  -0.36  
SIZE -0.0010  -0.46  
LEV 0.0603***  4.13  
ROA 0.0501***  8.34  
OCF -0.3598***  -16.67  
MB 0.0000  -0.26  
AL -0.0067  -0.89  
AD 0.0047  0.95  
PIND 0.0012  0.28  
AUD 0.0093  1.29  
OPIN 0.0394***  5.26  
CROSS 0.0121  1.04  
Adj. R2 0.091  
F value 10.94***  
Notes: The dependent variable is MDA, which is the level of earnings management calculated by the modified 
Jones model. If the observation year is 2001, then Y1 equals 1, and 0 otherwise; If the observation year is 2002, 
then Y2 equals 1, and 0 otherwise; if the observation year is during 2003-2005, then Y3 equals 1, and 0 otherwise. 
If a firm was an FLTRT firm and had politically connected management, then G1 equals 1, and 0 otherwise. If a 
firm was an FLTRT firm but did not have politically connected management, then G2 equals 1, and 0 otherwise. If 
a firm was not an FLTRT firm but had politically connected management, then G3 equals 1, and 0 otherwise. GiYj 
is the interaction term of Gi and Yj (i=1,2,3; j=1,2,3). SIZE is the natural logarithm of the year-end total asset of the 
current year. LEV is the year-end leverage of the current year, which is defined as long-term liabilities divided by 
total assets. ROA is defined as earnings before tax divided by the year-end total assets. OCF is defined as the 
year-end operation cash flow divided by total assets. MB is the year-end market value over book value. If ROE is 
positive but less than 0.01, then AL equals 1, and 0 otherwise. ROE is net earnings divided by the year-end equity. 
If DROE is positive but less than 0.01, then AD equals 1, and 0 otherwise. DROE is the change of ROE of the 
current year. If a firm is in a protected industry, then PIND equals1, and 0 otherwise. If the audit firm hired by the 
listed company is one of the Big Four, AUD equals 1, and 0 otherwise. If the audit opinion is unqualified, OPIN 
equals 1, and 0 otherwise. If the firm has H shares, then CROSS equals 1, and 0 otherwise. 
***: significant at the 1% level; **: significant at the 5% level; *: significant at the 10% level. 
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Table 5. Sample for effective tax rate analysis. 
 G1 G2 Total 
1999 17 94 111 
2000 24 111 135 
2001 23 126 149 
2002 20 132 152 
2003 24 141 165 
2005 26 148 174 
2005 23 147 170 
Total 157 899 1056 
Notes: G1 firms are firms that had both FLTRT and politically connected management. G2 firms are firms that had 
FLTRT, but didn’t have politically connected management. 
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Table 6. The economic consequences of earnings management. 
 Estimate t value 
Intercept 0.0052  0.05 
Y1 0.0027  0.21 
Y2 0.0550***  4.26 
Y3 0.0634***  6.23 
G1 0.0161  0.82 
G1Y1 0.0445  1.37 
G1Y2 0.0091  0.27 
G1Y3 0.0013  0.05 
MDA -0.0143  -0.44 
SIZE 0.0037  0.73 
LEV -0.0217  -0.47 
ROA 0.4561***  5.07 
CAPINT 0.0340  1.46 
INVINT 0.0717**  2.52 
MB -0.0010***  -2.97 
Adj. R-sq 0.084  
F value 7.93***  
Notes: The dependent variable is ETR, which is defined as the ratio of tax expense over profit before interest and 
tax. If the observation year is 2001, then Y1 equals 1, and 0 otherwise; If the observation year is 2002, then Y2 
equals 1, and 0 otherwise; if the observation year is after 2002, then Y3 equals 1, and 0 otherwise. If a firm was an 
FLTRT firm and had politically connected management, then G1 equals 1, and 0 otherwise. G1Y1 (G1Y2/G1Y3) is 
the interaction term of G1 and Y1 (Y2/Y3). MDA is the level of earnings management, which is calculated using the 
modified Jones model. SIZE is the natural logarithm of the year-end total asset of the current year. LEV is the 
year-end leverage of the current year, which is defined as long-term liabilities divided by total assets. ROA is the 
return on asset of the current year, which is defined as earnings before tax divided by total asset. CAPINT is 
defined as the year-end net fixed assets divided by total assets of the current year. INVINT is defined as the 
year-end inventory divided by total assets by the current year. MB is defined as the year-end market to book value 
of the current year. 
***: significant at the 1% level; **: significant at the 5% level; *: significant at the 10% level. 
